As I have commented here before, one of the pleasures of writing a book is receiving reactions and comments, especially those from people who you have learned from and respected. Sheila Jasanoff, of Harvard University, is one of the giants of the “science and technology studies” community, and in the current issue of the American Scientist, she writes a review of The Honest Broker. But unlike Eugene Skolnikoff, another giant in the field who recently reviewed the book, Professor Jasanoff is far more critical of the book. However, after carefully reading her review, I remain unclear as to what her objections actually are to the book, and this post explains why.

Professor Jasanoff’s summary of the book, which comprises most of the review is excellent and clearly written. It is clear that she read the book closely. Jasanoff offers two critiques of the book.

There are two major difficulties with this analysis. First and most important, scholarship in the field of science and technology studies has shown that the dividing line between forms of political engagement is not fixed in advance but continually shifts in the process of knowledge making.

Right. I agree completely. Professor Jasanoff explains this critique with the following example:

Many choices that were once regarded as matters of lifestyle or values alone (“abortion politics”) have been converted into choices that are now constrained by things we know (“tornado politics”). Thus it is no longer appropriate to discriminate against people simply because their skin color is different; today, mainstream biology tells us that such surface appearances do not correlate with significant differences in ability or behavior and hence do not justify racial discrimination in matters of public policy.

Does she really wish to assert that opposition to discrimination has its roots in scientific understandings of biology? How would she explain pre-Darwinian emancipation movements? Such movements were justified in terms of fundamental human rights and values, not science. Similarly, would Professor Jasanoff find discrimination acceptable if science could show some differences in “ability or behavior’? I rather doubt it.

So I certainly agree that community values evolve over time and issues that were once contested can take on a consensus (and of course the directionality can also work in the other direction). So, in the language of the book, issues can at one point in time be characterized best as Abortion Politics, and at another time as Tornado Politics. As I say in the book, context matters. So I am unclear about her objection. But if she is implying that science leads to a broad consensus on values in situations like racial discrimination, then it is safe to say that we disagree.

The second critique is:

A second, and related, point is that science does not always serve the public interest best by widening the scope of policy choice.

This is an unfortunate mischaracterization of the book, because nowhere in the book do I make this claim. In fact, in several places I emphasize the importance of all of the four roles for science that I describe in a healthy democracy. For instance, on p. 136 I write:

Issue Advocacy [that seeks to reduce choice], as important as it is, should always be complimented by scientists choosing to faithfully serve in each of the other roles.

In this context, she takes issue with my critique of the role of scientists in the climate change debate:

Pielke cites the example of climate scientists, who in his view unjustifiably narrowed the debate on policy alternatives by too enthusiastically embracing the Kyoto Protocol. Knowledge about climate change could have supported a far wider set of policies, he argues. There were, however, good political reasons for supporting the Kyoto Protocol at the moment when it was negotiated.Students of international regimes know that treaties are only a formal starting point for international cooperation. Like any good legal framework, a treaty acquires a life of its own. It helps keep parties at the bargaining table to carry on a discussion that may, over time, bring about significant changes in the treaty’s original framing assumptions and prescriptions. Support for Kyoto, accordingly, could legitimately have been seen as support for ongoing multilateral conversation—which many people would have regarded as preferable to a situation in which the world’s leading climate player, the United States, simply opted out of international deliberations.

Here she is unfortunately far too imprecise. I agree with her 100% that there were indeed good political reasons for supporting the Kyoto Protocol — Consider that early in the Bush Administration I argued that the President was mistaken in pulling out of the process. My complaint about scientists and Kyoto has been, as Professor Jasanoff accurately writes, that the scientific community contributed to a narrowing of the political debate, and not that there were no good reasons to support Kyoto. As the Kyoto Process reaches what may be an inglorious end, we are now paying the price for allowing Kyoto to be the only game in town.

My view is that climate policies, and indeed many others mired in deep conflict, are enhanced when options are openly discussed, and we avoid premature closure. If Professor Jasanoff is suggesting that climate discussions should focus on Kyoto and only Kyoto, then we do indeed disagree. Interestingly, in the book I make the exact same argument about the role of intelligence in the decision to go to war in Iraq, saying that in this case as well other possible options to a quick invasion were not openly considered, but Professor Jasanoff is silent on that case.

Professor Jasanoff continues along these lines offering the most puzzling comment in the entire review:

[STS scholars] see as problematic scientists’ tendency to naturalize or take for granted values and social preferences that are often embedded in the internal workings of science. As a result, many scientific priorities and methodological choices that should be open to wider debate remain insulated from critical scrutiny.

Right. And this seems perfectly consistent with her characterization earlier in the review of what I call “stealth issue advocates”:

Pielke’s greatest scorn is reserved for those scientist-experts who take politically interested advocacy positions without admitting to themselves or others that this is what they are doing.

Such “stealth issue advocacy” (a subset of what she calls “values and social preferences that are often embedded in the internal workings of science”) has been a central theme of Professor Jasanoff’s own work, and I cite her to that effect in the book, the following passage is from her book “The Fifth Branch: Science Advisors as Policymakers”:

The notion that scientific advisors can or do limit themselves to addressing purely scientific issues, in particular, seems fundamentally misconceived … the advisory process seems increasingly important as a locus for negotiating scientific differences that have political weight.

So it is with some surprise that I see Professor Jasanoff’s review close with what appears to be a call for the reification of the separation of science and politics:

Pielke is right to want more honest brokers in the policy process. But expert policy advisers would do best to function as honest brokers of scientific alternatives—disclosing the limits of their information and the extent of their uncertainty in a spirit of professional humility.

I am unclear how this follows from what comes immediately before, or how it contradicts in anyway what I have written in the book:

What STS scholars have insisted on is that the very process of collecting and codifying information is value-laden and should not be insulated from democratic accountability. Nor should ambiguities in the available knowledge be concealed behind monolithic claims of scientific certainty.

I agree and never say anything differently.

I appreciate that Sheila Jasanoff has taken the time to provide a critical reading of the book. Unfortunately, and perhaps as might be expected from the author, I don’t find the critiques stand up to the high standard that Professor Jasanoff has set for herself in the past. Ultimately, readers of the book will have to come to their own judgments.