One interesting characteristic about science policy is that it does not map neatly onto the stereotypical liberal-conservative Manichean worldview. To take just one example, two columns in the past month over at Tech Central Station, a web site run by folks who espouse a “faith in technology and free markets,” show wildly divergent views on science policy.

In an essay from 15 July 2005, Sallie Baliunas makes the fanciful suggestion that public demands for relevance from government-supported research have lead to increasing fraud among scientists. She describes how once Richard Feynman was “freed of the impediment of relevance” he was then able to conduct novel research into theoretical physics and collect a Nobel Prize. But Baliunas does not seem to recognize that federal funding for nuclear physics in the twentieth century was motivated by a very practical objective, winning the Cold War. Without the Soviet Union, federal funding for nuclear physics would surely have been considerably less. Just look at the funding trend for this area in the post-Cold War era. She expresses concern that if scientists are asked to perform research with practical applications, it might “drive away Feynman-type thinkers” and also lead to research misconduct by scientists upset that they have not been given a blank check and no accountability.

A very different essay comes from Iain Murray, who writes,


“The distinction between basic science and applied science (and its development) is, at heart, an elitist and artificial one. It is based on a misunderstanding of the scientific dynamic that was set in policy stone by Vannevar Bush, President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s top science adviser, during World War II. It relies on what is known as the “Linear Model” of science, which states that “basic research” develops a pool of knowledge from which “applied research” draws practical benefits, which are then developed into economic goods… Science’s role in the economy, it appears, is mainly dependent on the technological portion — the applied research and development — of the model. Basic research contributes far less than the linear model suggests.” Murray’s conclusion could not be any more different from Baliunas’ view: “When it comes to science policy, the utility of the science is what is important.”

On the other side of the political spectrum there is similar incoherence about science policy. And this is a good thing. It reflects the fact that we are in a period of transition from a post-World War II science policy to its successor, and views on science policy have not yet gelled. The exact characteristics of science policy in the 21st century remain unclear, but we’ll get there sooner with people like Baliunas and Murray, and their counterparts from other points on the ideological spectrum, engaging in public debate and discussion on what science policy ought to look like. And without a doubt the issues of practical relevance, federal and private funding and, yes, the politicization of science ought to be at the core of any such dialogue.

For more on this subject see this paper:

Pielke, Jr., R.A., and R. Byerly, Jr., 1998: Beyond Basic and Applied. Physics Today, 51(2), 42-46. (PDF)